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CHAPTER 14
CONTROL CHALLENGES
Abstract
In this chapter, we introduce methods to address resiliency issues for control systems. The
main challenge for control systems is its cyber-physical system nature which strongly cou-
ples the cyber systems with physical layer dynamics. Hence the resiliency issues for con-
trol systems need to be addressed by integrating the cyber resiliency with the physical layer
resiliency. We introduce frameworks that can provide a holistic view of the control system
resiliency and a quantitative design paradigm that can enable an optimal cross-layer and
cross-stage design at the planning, operation, and recovery stage of control systems. The
control systems are often large-scale systems in industrial application and critical infras-
tructures. Decentralized control of such systems is indispensable. We extend the resiliency
framework to address distributed and collaborative resiliency among decentralized control
agents.
Control Challenges.
By Quanyan Zhu Copyright c© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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2 CONTROL CHALLENGES
Objectives
The objectives of this chapter is to provide an overview of resilient control systems:
Understand the cross-layer tradeoffs between the security at the cyber layer and the
resiliency at the physical layer.
Understand the cross-stage resiliency design including ex ante planning, interim op-
eration, and ex poste recovery.
Understand games-in-games design paradigm for the multi-stage and multi-layer de-
sign of resilient control systems.
Understand the control challenges for distributed control systems.
14.1 Resiliency Challenges in Control Systems
Modern control systems are equipped with information system technologies (ICTs) that
can provide situational awareness of the plant and enable a fast response to emergency and
security breaches. As the control systems benefit from the enhanced functionalities and
autonomy, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities become prominent issues to deal with. Adver-
saries can take a sequence of moves and launch multi-phase and multi-stage attacks from
the early reconnaissance to the objective of data exfiltration. This structure of attacks is
known as the cyber kill chain. The defense against such attacks include detection of an
adversary, disruption of the network system, cyber deception to create uncertainties and
costs for the attacker, and many other techniques (See Jajodia et al. [2011], Zhu and Bas¸ar
[2013], Pawlick et al. [2019], Jajodia et al. [2016]). Despite the effort in developing cyber
defense for control systems, the perfect security is not always achievable. Achieving per-
fect security would either require a cost-prohibitive amount of resources to maintain the
security or lead to a degradation of system operability and usability. Hence it is important
to shift the focus from security-centered design to the paradigm of secure and resilience de-
sign of control systems. Adding resiliency as an additional dimension to the new paradigm
complements the sole reliance on ex ante perfect security technologies as a solution with
interim and ex poste resiliency mechanisms as solutions when the ex ante security mecha-
nism fails to protect the control system.
Resiliency is a key system concept that focuses on the post-event behaviors of a system.
For example, when a cyber attack has successfully reached its target, any security mech-
anism becomes futile at this point and we need to rely on resiliency mechanisms that can
reduce the impact of this successful attack and enable a fast recovery to restore the opera-
tions to their normal state. On the contrary, security mechanisms are often used as tools to
prevent successful attacks or attackers from achieving their objectives. Hence security and
resilience are dual concepts and there are fundamental relationships between them.
First, there exists a tradeoff between security and resiliency. When there is perfect secu-
rity, resiliency becomes unnecessary. The need for resiliency is high when the security is
poor. Second, security and resiliency resolutions have to implemented jointly. One cannot
count on either security or resiliency solutions to safeguard the system from adversarial
behaviors. The cost for security and resiliency solutions are often different. The level of
security and resiliency implemented in the system should be jointly cost optimal.
Understanding these relationships provides a fundamental understanding toward de-
signing secure and resilient systems. There are two key challenges to design secure and
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Figure 14.1 Multi-stage planning and design for resilient control systems: Ex ante stage plans
resiliency. Interim stage executes resilient control. Ex poste stage restores system performance after
unanticipated attacks.
resilient systems. One is the cross-layer challenge and the other is the cross-stage chal-
lenge. Cross-layer challenges refer to the fact that the security issues often reside at the
cyber layer of the system while the resiliency often deals with the last-mile issue and in
the context of control systems, the resiliency issues sit at the physical layer of the systems.
In other words, the failure in the protection at the cyber layer can lead to malfunctioning
of the physical system performance. The joint design of secure and resilient solutions is
naturally cross-layer. It would require the understanding the dependency and interdepen-
dency among human, cyber, and physical layers of the control system. For example, the
failure of cyber defense against an advanced persistent threat would lead to data injection
on sensors and the manipulation of the controller of the physical plant. Human negligence
in system configurations would lead to cyber vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the
attackers to reach targeted physical assets.
The second challenge of resilient control systems arises from the fact that resiliency
is a dynamical system concept. Improving resiliency involves multi-stage planning and
design including ex ante planning, interim execution, and ex poste recovery. The ex ante
stage refers to the planning stage before the control system starts to run. At this stage,
one needs to invest resources and plan contingencies to provide information and physical
resources to enable fast recovery at later stages. For example, one can add redundancies
such as sensors and power generators to prepare for attack on sensors and attack-induced
loss of power. One can also design secure and switching controllers in advance to prepare
for the worst-case operational environment and provides a contingency controller when
the control system encounters failures. The offline design of such controller at the ex ante
stage prepare for a set of anticipated attacks in later stages. However, unanticipated attacks
can still occur. In addition, the preparation for a large set of events can be expensive. There
exists a tradeoff between what events to be prepared for at the ex ante stage and what events
to be left to deal with in later stages. Hence from the set of anticipated events we need to
select high-impact and high-frequency ones first.
The interim stage refers to the operation stage of the control systems. By running the
controller that prepares for a selected set of anticipated events, the control system can run
smoothly and intelligently when it encounters these prepared events. The control system
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can switch to a different control logic or leverage built-in resources to handle events that
occurred. In Fig. 14.1, at time t1, an anticipated event has occurred; for example, there is
a loss of a sensor. By switching to a redundant sensor, the interim stage operation does not
suffer any loss of system performance.
The ex poste stage refers to the stage where unanticipated event occurs and the recovery
process kicks off. The probability of running into an unanticipated event depends on the
set of events the ex ante controller has prepare for. In Fig. 14.1, the unanticipated event
a occurs at t2. The expected value of t2 would depend on the frequency of event a and
whether it is been taken into account at the ex ante stage. Since no contingency plan has
been made for event a, the system will suffer a performance degradation. The ex poste
resiliency design aims to detect the event quickly and find a self-healing mechanism that
can restore the system to its normal operation or an acceptable performance level. De-
picted in Fig. 14.1, the system performance degrades to its maximum difference M and
then gradually recovers to the level D at time t3. The ex poste resiliency is measured by
the total performance loss after the event. The goal of ex poste resiliency is to minimize
this loss by fast responding to the event and developing an effective restoration plan. The
restoration plan would depend on the configurable resources available to the system and
the ex ante resource investment made for the control system. For example, when an at-
tack has successfully compromised a centrifuge control system, the system can detect and
reboot. The cost for reboot depends on whether the control system is well equipped with
computational resources and human resources to enable the fast response.
It is clear that the concept of resiliency spans 3 stages of the control systems. The
planning of ex ante resiliency affects the resource availability of and the need for ex poste
resiliency. Hence, the ex ante resiliency planning and the ex post resiliency mechanism
have to be jointly designed. This chapter will introduce a games-in-games framework to
develop a cross-layer cross-stage design framework. We will use examples from unmanned
vehicles to illustrate the games-in-games framework.
14.2 Resiliency Design Framework
A natural framework to enable the cross-layer design is to use the games-in-games frame-
work. Game-theoretic methods have been used to capture different cyber attack scenarios
and models including jamming, spoofing, and network configurations. Each game can be
used to model a cyberattack scenario. Composing these games together forms a set of
anticipated adversarial behaviors at the cyber layer to be considered. Similarly, the attack
behaviors at the physical layer can also be modeled by a set of physical layer games. For
example, the attacker can choose to inject bad data into sensors while the defender can
choose which sensors to use. The attacker can determine the switching policy of the con-
trollers while the attacker can determine how to compromise the logic of one of the control
laws. Composing the physical layer games together provides a framework to design ex
ante and ex poste resiliency mechanisms. The cyber games and the physical layer games
are interdependent. The outcome of one game would lead to a new game. The games-in-
games framework is illustrated in Fig. 14.2. Cyber games G2,1 and G2,2 are composed
together to form G2. The physical layer games G1,1 and G1,2 are composed to form G1.
G1 and G2 are interconnected to form a larger game G.
A natural control framework to capture the multi-stage features of resilient control sys-
tems is model-predictive control or moving-horizon techniques. The moving-horizon con-
trol looks N steps into the future, prepares for possible events, and finds optimal control
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Figure 14.2 Composition of cyber games and physical layer games together to form a cross-layer
adversarial model.
strategies to be implemented at the current stage. The ex ante control design takes into
account a credible set of anticipated adversarial models. This design process can be for-
mulated as a game between the control designer and adversaries. The game model can be
chosen to capture the cross-layer nature of the control system as illustrated in Fig. 14.2.
The ex ante control is implemented immediately after the design. If no unanticipated be-
haviors occur, this game-based moving-horizon control continues. When unanticipated
adversarial behavior happen, in the next moving horizon, the control design not only pre-
pares for the anticipated adversarial behaviors but also determines ways to recover from
the unanticipated attack. The moving-horizon technique directly incorporates the ex ante
planning by looking into possible future events and the ex poste recovery by immediately
reconfiguring the system in the next moving horizon.
14.2.1 Control of Autonomous Systems in Adversarial Environment
To illustrate the moving-horizon resilient control design paradigm, we present a case study
of control of mobile autonomous systems in adversarial environment. The objective of
the control is to maintain the connectivity of the autonomous system in an environment
where attacker can jam the communications among the autonomous systems. The operator
does not know the capability of the attacker, i.e., how many links the attacker can jam, and
where and when the attacker will jam the communications. The operator prepares for the
anticipated level of attacks and plans the control in a moving-horizon way. At every time
k, the operator solves the following problem:
Qk : max
x(k+c)
min
e∈E
λ2(e, x(k + c)). (14.1)
Here x(k) is the configuration of the mobile network at time k, i.e., the position of the
mobile agents. Two mobile agents can form a link when they are sufficiently close within
a desirable range of communications. Hence the configuration x(k) includes a network
whose connectivity is described by the algebraic connectivity of the network, denoted by
λ2, i.e., the second-smallest eigenvalue of the associated Laplacian matrix. At each time
step k, the operator determines where the agents should move to in the next time step
x(k + c), where c is a time interval. The control is constrained by the physical dynamics
of autonomous systems. To maintain connectivity, the operator aims to maximize the level
of connectivity as much as he could at time k + c by anticipating the worst-case adver-
sarial behaviors given a certain level of attacks, described by the set E. For example, the
operator can anticipate one-link removal and determine how agents can move and main-
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Figure 14.3 Network connectivity: dynamic configuration of secure robotic network. The GPS
spoofing attack is introduced at time step 9, and it lasts for 5 steps.
tain connected secure to such one-link removal. On one hand, the higher capability of the
attacker, it becomes more difficult for the operator to find a controller to be secure to the
attack level. On the other hand, if the operator underestimates the attacker, his control
strategies will not achieve a desirable connectivity. Hence the operator should anticipate a
reasonable level of attacks and designs an ex ante controller that will be implemented at the
interim stage. When the attacker?s capability does not exceed the attack level anticipated
by the ex ante controller, the network connectivity is maintained as expected. When the
attacker?s capability exceeds the anticipated level, the network connectivity may not be
achieved and the ex poste resiliency mechanism will be designed at time k + c. In other
words, the problem for the operator at k + c, Qk+c, includes how to react to the failure of
network connectivity and designs new control laws to heal the broken links while antici-
pating new attacks at time k + c. The anticipation of attack levels can be adjusted from
time k to k + c.
This moving-horizon framework has been shown to be effective in obtaining the self-
adaptability, self-healing, and resilience of the Internet of battlefield things. Specifically,
the unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) network should coordinate its actions with the un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV) network and the soldier network to achieve a highly con-
nected global network. The designed decentralized algorithm yields an intelligent control
of each agent to respond to others to optimize real-time connectivity under adversaries. Fig.
14.3 shows an example of a two-layer robotic network which is robust to jamming attack at
every step. Fig. 14.4 shows the algebraic connectivity over time associated with the two-
layer network. Furthermore, the agents can respond to the spoofing attack quickly which
shows the resilience of the control strategy. The developed moving-horizon framework can
be further adopted to address the mosaic control design as the framework provides built-in
security and resilience for each component in the system which guarantee the performance
of the integrated system.
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Figure 14.4 The network connectivity over time.
14.2.2 Cross-Layer Defense for Cloud-Enabled Internet of Controlled Things
To illustrate games-in-games framework, we consider the Internet of Controlled Things
(IoCT) that integrates computing, control, sensing, and networking. The IoCT relies on
local clouds to interface between heterogeneous components. The cloud-enabled IoCT is
composed of three interacting layers: a cloud layer, a communication layer, and a physical
layer In the first layer, the cloud-services are threatened by attackers capable of APTs
and defended by network administrators (or “defenders”). The interaction at each cloud-
service is modeled using the FlipIt game recently proposed by Bowers et al. Bowers
et al. [2012] and van Dijk et al. Van Dijk et al. [2013]. We use one FlipIt game per cloud-
service. In the communication layer, the cloud services–which may be controlled by the
attacker or defender according to the outcome of the FlipIt game–transmit information to
a device which decides whether to trust the cloud-services. This interaction is captured
using a signaling game. At the physical layer, the utility parameters for the signaling game
are determined using optimal control. The cloud, communication, and physical layers
are interdependent. This motivates an overall equilibrium concept called Gestalt Nash
equilibrium (GNE). GNE requires each game to be solved optimally given the results of
the other games. Because this is a similar idea to best-response in Nash equilibrium, we
call the multi-game framework a game-of-games.
A composition of a FlipIt game G1, Van Dijk et al. [2013], Bowers et al. [2012],
and a signaling game G2, Spence [1978], Banks and Sobel [1987], depicted in Fig. 14.5,
has been used to provide a strategic trust management in Internet of things (IoT) networks
vulnerable to advanced persistent threats. The game G1 describes the strategic interactions
between an attacker and a cloud service provider where the attacker aims to gain control of
the computing resources and the cloud service provider protects and audits the system. The
gameG2 describes the information asymmetry between the sender of the message (i.e., the
computational results) and the IoT as the receiver of the message. G1 andG2 are composed
sequentially as in Fig. 14.5. An attacker and a defender play the FlipIt game for control
of the cloud. Then, the winner sends a command to the device in the signaling game.
The Gestalt Nash equilibrium of the meta-game predicts the risk of sequential adversarial
interactions. As shown in Fig. 14.6, the equilibrium can be computed as the intersection
of blue and red curves in an iterative manner within a finite number of steps.
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Figure 14.5 Conceptual model of the composed G1 and G2.
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Figure 14.6 Iterations to compute a Gestalt Nash equilibrium.
14.3 Resiliency for Decentralized Control Systems
Resilient design for distributed systems requires engineering agents with flexible interop-
erability and the capability of self-adaptability, self-healing, and resiliency. It is important
that systems can achieve its objective when one node goes away or fails. In addition, a
subsystem can respond to other subsystems in a non-deterministic/stochastic way. Such
a design increases the composability and modularity of the system design. For example,
agents can randomly arrive and respond in a stochastic but structured way to other agents in
an uncertain environment. However, the structured randomness leads to emerging system
behaviors that manifest desirable properties for the objective of the entire mission.
Systems that have such properties are easily composable and resilient-by-design. With-
out a pre-planned integration among agents, the agents can adapt their responses and re-
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configure their own systems based on the type of agents with whom they interact. Agents
can be easily composed to achieve a prescribed objective through an unprescribed path. In
adversarial environments, the agents can reconfigure their responses and roles to achieve
the global mission in spite of the failures of nodes and links. The system can still operate
when one piece is missing. It is the epicenter of the mosaic designs.
We can leverage the games-in-games principle is a framework that provides a theoretical
underpinning and a guideline for distributed resilient control designs. Games-in-games
approach integrates three layers of design for each agent: strategic layer, tactical layer,
and mission layer. At the tactical layer, the agents learn and respond to their environment
quickly to unanticipated events such as attacks, disruptions, and changes of other agents.
At the strategic layer, the agents plan for a more extended period of time by taking into
account the long-term interactions with the environment and other agents. The agents can
make goal-oriented planning at each stage. At the mission layer, the agents develop stage-
by-stage planning of multi-stage objectives to achieve the mission despite the uncertainties
and online changes.
Each layer corresponds to a game of a different scale. For example, at the tactical
layer, a game associated with an agent describes its interaction with an adversary, e.g., a
jammer, a spoofer, or a sudden loss of a neighboring node. Solutions to this game can
prepare nodes for unanticipated attacks and secure the agents. At the strategic layer, an
N-person dynamic game describes the longer-term interactions among cooperative agents,
each seeking control policies to achieve individual stage objectives. The individual control
would lead to achieving global objectives (such as connectivity and network formation).
At the mission layer, each agent plans at each stage their stage objectives at the tactical
layer. This planning is obviously under a lot of uncertainties and needs to be achieved in a
moving-horizon way.
The games-in-games framework enables security and resilience by design. From the
perspective of security, the framework anticipates the attack behavior and designs a con-
trol policy that would prepare to defend against the anticipated attacks. The framework
provides a clean-slate design and provides built-in security for each system component
that would lead to the security of the integrated system. From the perspective of resiliency,
the framework enables each system to respond to the unanticipated events at each time
instant. Each agent can respond to events that inflict damages on the agent and go through
a self-healing process that can recover itself from the attacks and failures if possible. If the
full recovery is not achievable, the agents will develop control strategies that will allow a
graceful performance degradation.
14.4 Conclusions and New Challenges
This chapter has introduced two key challenges for resilient control systems. One is the
cross-layer challenge requires an integrated cyber-physical perspective. The optimal de-
sign pivots on the understanding of the tradeoffs between the security at the cyber layer
and the resiliency at the physical layer. The other is the cross-stage resiliency mechanism
that requires three stage resiliency design including ex ante planning, interim operation,
and ex poste recovery. The games-in-games framework provides a design paradigm for
the multi-stage and multi-layer design of resilient control systems. The framework is par-
ticularly useful for distributed control systems by designing modular agents that can work
together.
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The chapter has presented two applications. One is the control of autonomous vehicles
in adversarial environment and the other one is the cross-layer defense for cloud-enabled
Internet of Controlled Things. The methodology presented in these two case studies can be
further generalized and made applicable to other systems including smart grids, transporta-
tion systems, and manufacturing systems. The new challenge with these large-scale sys-
tems is the scalability of the solutions and the incompleteness of the situational awareness.
The resiliency design would need mechanisms that can achieve scalable yet sub-optimal
resiliency and deal with time delay and non-global system state information.
14.5 Further Reading
Game-theoretic methods have been widely used to model adversarial behaviors in wireless
communications (See Zhang and Zhu [2017], Zhu et al. [2012a, 2011a, 2010a], Farhang
et al. [2015], Zhu et al. [2011b, 2010b]), network configuration (See Fung and Zhu [2016],
Manshaei et al. [2013], Zhu et al. [2012b, 2010c]), and control systems (See Zhu and Basar
[2015], Rieger et al. [2019], Zhu and Bas¸ar [2011], Zhu et al. [2013], Miao et al. [2018],
Xu and Zhu [2015]). The applications of security games have addressed the critical infras-
tructure protection (See Huang and Zhu [2019a], Zhu and Rass [2018], Chen et al. [2017],
Chen and Zhu [2017a]), cyber insurance (See Zhang and Zhu [2019], Zhang et al. [2017],
Zhang and Zhu [2016], Chen and Zhu [2018]), cyber deception (See Pawlick et al. [2018a],
Zheng and Castan˜o´n [2012], Zhu et al. [2012c], Pawlick et al. [2019], Huang and Zhu
[2020], Hora´k et al. [2017]), adversarial machine learning (See Huang and Zhu [2019b],
Pawlick and Zhu [2017a], Zhang and Zhu [2015, 2018]), and network systems (See Chen
and Zhu [2019], Chen et al. [2019], Chen and Zhu [2017b], Yunhan and Quanyan [2019],
Pawlick and Zhu [2017b]).
Game-theoretic approaches have also addressed the resilient design of control systems.
Games-in-games approach has been proposed Section 14.2.1 is based on the work of Chen
and Zhu [2019], Chen and Zhu [2016] in which two layers of mobile agents are controlled
to maintain network connectivity. Section 14.2.2 is based on the work of Pawlick et al.
[2015, 2018b]. The Internet of Controlled Things (IoCTs) extends the concept of Internet
of Things (IoTs) and studies a cloud-enabled sensing and actuation architecture with three
layers of interacting systems including the cloud, communication networks, and sensor-
actuator networks. The games-in-games principle was first discussed in Zhu and Basar
[2015] and has been used for addressing applications of multi-layer networks (See Chen
et al. [2019], Nugraha et al. [2019], Xu and Zhu [2018, 2016, 2017, 2015]) and trust man-
agement (See Pawlick et al. [2018b, 2015], Pawlick and Zhu [2017b]).
EXERCISES
14.1 Consider a smart electric power system, discuss the cross-layer control challenges
of the cyber-enabled power systems. Present methods to improve the resiliency of the
power systems. Discuss how to scale the resiliency solutions when the size distribution
and transmission network increases.
14.2 Write down the dynamics of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and create a case
study of a network of 5 UAVs. Simulate 3 steps by solving a sequence of 3 optimization
problems (14.1). Use Matlab to present the simulation results.
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